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number of official statements about Vietnam have led to a state of what
seems to me legitimate skepticism on the part of the public. Did the
various security forces involved mislead the Warren Commission? Did
the immense and expensive apparatus of foreign intelligence somehow
mislead Secretary McNamara into his manifestly erroneous estimates
of the costs of Vietnam? Is our foreign policy now influenced by computer or other inadequacies in estimating hazards as well as simple
costs?
These are related questions, and they may lead the observer to hope
for future study of the problems created by the assassination of President Kennedy and the Report of the Warren Commission.
MALCOLM P. SHARP*

Professor Emeritus of Law, The University of Chicago; Visiting Professor of Law,
The University of New Mexico.

The Zoning Game: Municipal Practices and Policies. RecARD F.
BABCOCK. University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 202. $5.75.

Mr. Babcock begins his book with a description of how the zoning
game was and is now played. Next he describes the players-the layman
as public and private decision-maker, the planner, the lawyer, the
judge. They turn out, by and large, to be weak nonheros. Mr. Babcock
then criticizes the purposes and principles of the game. The backers of
the sport, who bet heavily on the players, are such interested parties
as the landowner, the neighbor, the municipality, the metropolitan
area. He concludes with recommendations on rule changes.
Mr. Babcock is entitled to write this book, he says, because he has
written a law review article on zoning with 310 footnotes. He is also
the pre-eminent land use planning and controls lawyer in private practice. He is a lawyer's lawyer; a planner's confidant; and, due to his interest in the esoteric, an academician's delight. The Zoning Game adds
to Mr. Babcock's stature.
The book is witty, honest, and free from planners' and lawyers' jargon and euphemisms. The real world of zoning comes through. Not
having read the book, most lawyers would not know, for example, why
motels are excluded from zones in which hotels are permitted, or why
it is easier to get a rezoning for a supermarket than for a discount
store. He makes frequent use of the first person, without becoming
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anecdotal and self-congratulatory. The book is quotable and constitutes
a kind of zoning primer. Its index permits exploitation of both features.
I noted only two faults in style. First, Mr. Babcock writes better than
the persons he too extensively quotes. Second, the footnotes are numbered within each chapter and are all at the end of the book. Reference
is unduly difficult.
Mr. Babcock selects most of the discussion in his book to support
his thesis relating to the restructuring of the zoning game. His thesis,
in three parts, is that state zoning enabling acts ought to provide:
1. More detailed descriptions of the required administrative procedures at the local level.
2. Restatements of the major substantive criteria by which the reasonableness of local decision-making is measured.
3. Provisions creating a state-wide administrative agency to review the
decisions of local authorities in land-use matters, with final appeal
to an appellate court.
I would like to (a) comment on these suggestions individually, (b)
discuss the wisdom of reducing the role of the courts, which is implicit
in all of the suggestions, and (c) make some observations on other
points raised by Mr. Babcock's discussion.
More Detailed Descriptions of Administrative Procedures
Mr. Babcock's first thesis is that enabling acts ought to provide more
detailed descriptions of required administrative procedures at the local
level. The enabling acts of many states already set forth detailed procedures to be followed. Many courts have been willing to reverse when
proper procedure was not followed. Local bodies, particularly in
smaller communities, still butcher procedure. Passing another statute
is not going to upgrade Farmer Jones on the Elbowoods Township
Board of Zoning Adjustment.
As long as due process tests are met, it is difficult to get too excited
about procedural errors. Statewide uniformity of procedure would be
nice, but uniformity has not yet been fully achieved even among local
courts. In California, no error in zoning procedure will result in reversal unless the error is prejudicial, results in substantial injury, and
causes a different result than would otherwise have been probable.1
1 Cal. Gov't C. § 65801, Stats. 1965, c. 1880, p. 4346. Even if procedural due process
was violated, the petitioner still has to prove that a different result would have been
probable. How do you do this? The drafters of the statute, who were largely allied with
the League of California Cities, indicated that the statute was necessary to prevent the
courts from reversing on technical procedural errors. That is rubbish, for the California
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While California has gone too far, its example may illustrate a trend
toward less rather than more focus on procedural requirements.
Restatement of Substantive Criteria
To support his thesis that there should be a statutory restatement of
the major substantive criteria by which the reasonableness of local decision-making is measured, Mr. Babcock attempts to uncover major voids
in judge-made law. I find no major voids. For example, he says there are
hardly any cases on architectural controls. That is true, but cases on
the closely related matters of historic districts, preservation of natural
beauty, and aesthetics are numerous. Doubt about the validity of architectural controls is generated more by conflicting judicial views
than by a void of law in the area.
Another example of a void in case law, Mr. Babcock says, is the small
number of cases on the uncompensated elimination of nonconforming
uses. He says the cases can be counted on your fingers. Yet California
has eighteen such cases, including several landmark decisions. 2 Similar
cases have occurred in other states and have been noted widely. If
there are voids, Mr. Babcock has not chosen the right examples to
convince me.
Are restatements of substantive criteria 3 necessary to get local governmental bodies to show greater concern for larger regions? Mr. Babcock's point on the need for localities to have awareness of the needs
of their regions is a valid one. Current literature accepts it. Courts have
been slow to impose this broader viewpoint. Perhaps lawyers have not
argued the matter; perhaps courts have been too respectful of local
municipal judgments. At any rate, court-made law could evolve. 4 Courts
courts have overlooked small errors. Perhaps the overreaching by municipal interests
evident in this statute will backfire. Previously, the courts at least had the opportunity
in some cases to reverse for procedural errors when they were really bothered by substantive matters. The courts may now be more likely to deal with the merits of cases.
2 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1913); Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931); Livingston Rock v. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal.
2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930);
City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
3 Mr. Babcock's thesis that there should be statutory restatements of the major substantive criteria by which the reasonableness of zoning may be judged is in part directed
to the cure of excessive municipal provincialism. This is not clear from the statement
of the thesis, but the legislation Mr. Babcock proposes and the examples he uses show
that the chief reason new criteria for judging reasonableness are needed is to force local
authorities to give due regard to the consequences of land uses on regional development.
For example, should a facility serving the region be excludable by a particular community?
4 For example, comprehensive plan requirements could be construed as requiring
consideration of regional matters.
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could use a little statutory inducement, but no grand restatement is
required. A simple directive that the police power must be used to
serve the welfare of the region ought to move the courts in the right
direction.
Creation of a State-Wide Administrative Body

Vigorous opposition to Mr. Babcock's first two proposals is not warranted, so I have been content to make only a few observations about
them. Vigorous opposition to the creation of a state-wide administrative body is warranted.
Much of Mr. Babcock's discussion of zoning is shaped to support his
thesis that there ought to be a state-wide administrative review body
for zoning cases. Some shaping of the facts is legitimate: the courts do it
all the time. It is not particularly harmful when the reader knows of an
earlier Babcock piece 5 in which the thesis was set forth.
To support his thesis, Mr. Babcock indicates that the legal profession has not been very interested in land use controls as a specialty.
Therefore, court resolution of land use planning disputes has not been
adequate. Mr. Babcock gives reasons why lawyers have not specialized.
One he omits is that lawyers generally like to practice law rather than
lobbying. Practice in the area of land use controls requires lobbying
before local zoning bodies. Lobbying is a difficult occupation for lawyers trained at working with the law rather than with local zoning
bodies. These bodies have few rules, and whatever the law trappings,
their decisions are overwhelmingly political.
In any event, specialty in land use controls is rapidly developing.
Mr. Babcock does not fully credit the law schools. As he says, land use
controls have not been taught in property or in constitutional law.
Nevertheless, they are now taught as a separate course or seminar in
approximately one hundred law schools, and approximately one hundred and fifteen law professors specialize in them. 6 Those numbers
have about quadrupled in five years. Six casebooks have been published.7 The classes are huge.
The number of separate courses may not increase substantially, for
land use planning and controls are now coming to constitute up to a
5 Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U. CHI. L.
REv. 509 (1959).
6 Both figures are based on lists in WEST PUBLISHING Co., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
223-25 (1967).
7 BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS (1964); GREEN, PLANNING LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
(1962); HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING (1959); HORACK 9. NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS (1955);
MANDELKER,

(1963).

MANAGING OUR URBAN

ENVIRONMENT

(1966); MILNER, COMMUNITY PLANNING
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third of the subject matter of first year property. This is due to rising
interest in land use controls and to disenchantment with medievalism.
Land use planning and controls have been and are a substantial part
of municipal corporations. In short, recent law school graduates are
now as well prepared in land use planning and controls as in most
areas. A landowner can hire competent counsel; a smaller municipality
can get help. Metropolitan, regional, and state planning agencies often
are given the duty of providing such aid. They at least know where help
can be obtained. A class action may be possible where an individual, as
8
a practical matter, cannot alone engage a municipality in litigation.
A specialized statewide review body would have many disadvantages.
Some may be listed, though I do not want to discuss the subject in
depth. There would be yet another set of reports. Whatever the subject matter jurisdiction given to the statewide body, there would be
litigation to determine exactly what it is. The statewide body might
become a place where specialists would talk to specialists. Zoning might
become yet more technical. The landowners or the municipalities
might take over the regulators, whereas courts are probably more
neutral. The present "fads" of zoning might become crystalized. There
might not be as much room for experimentation. The proliferation of
specialized tribunals is ill advised, and, if they are valid for zoning, the
arguments for separating out functions are equally valid for a hundred
other areas.
Would there be any advantages to state-wide administrative review
over court review? Zoning litigation, Mr. Babcock says, is too expensive
to permit the bringing of the case with the important principle but
the small economic consequence. That is true of all litigation. Would
it be less expensive if the litigant had to go from the local administrative body to some far distant point in the state and then to the appellate court, rather than first to the local court, as he does now? In any
event, zoning litigation is probably not that expensive. Mr. Babcock's
statements that few can afford an appeal seems inconsistent with his statements that the appellate courts feel themselves swamped with zoning
litigation. There is often a substantial economic consequence riding
on a zoning controversy. If zoning cases are not being appealed to the
courts in some states, it is probably due to the small chance of success.
Mr. Babcock indicates that some judges find zoning cases unsatisfying, frustrating, and dull, and that such judges should be shielded
from so many zoning cases. If those were the tests, another automobile
8 Santa Clara County Contractors Assn. v. City of Santa Clara, 232 Cal. App. 2d 564,
43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965). A subdivider who alone litigates the validity of a municipal
requirement may find it difficult to do business in the community again.
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negligence case would never be heard on appeal. Besides, many judges
do not feel judicial disengagement with zoning is desirable.0 If modem
society is too complex for all of the judges of appellate courts of broad
jurisdiction to be familiar with all of the kinds of technical litigation,
the answer is not to shield the courts from all but the familiar. A
better answer is specialization within the courts. One judge, surely,
can equip himself to understand the special problems of land uselocal police power litigation. He can be a resource for the other judges.
Chances that he will be the sole decision maker are slight. The others
will still see the big picture. The courts that do have a specialist are
the leading zoning appeal courts of the country. Justice Hall of the
New Jersey Supreme Court won Norman William's prize for the best
zoning decision of the year so many times that the prize was finally
given to the entire court.' There are probably more judges of like
talent to be discovered as soon as Norman Williams gets over his
Jersey provincialism.
Should the Role of the Courts Be Reduced?
Despite his general willingness to reduce the role of the courts,
Mr. Babcock makes a few suggestions for their guidance. That focus
should have been the book. Mr. Babcock should have employed his
prestige to tell the courts how zoning decisions ought to be made.
Many court decisions are wrong because the court's vested knowledge about Euclidian zoning (districting) blinds it to the validity of
the newer "flexibility" devices, such as special use permits, floating
zones, contract zoning, and planned unit developments. This type
of court often leaves the impression that the new zoning is being rejected merely because it is a new idea." I do not want to discuss wrong
court decisions of this sort, but, if Mr. Babcock had, I would have
agreed with him.
Other court decisions are wrong because the court is willing to ap9 "The time must never come when, because of frustration with concepts foreign to
their legal training, courts abdicate their judicial responsibility to protect the constitutional rights of individual citizens." National Land and Investment Company v. Kohn,
419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1966). "I positively do not agree with . . . this
court . . . which . . . has completely abdicated its judicial function in

favor of the

arbitrary and unreasonable action of city councils ....
" Clemons v. City of Los Angeles,
36 Cal. 2d 95, 114, 222 P.2d 439, 451 (1950) (dissent).
10 Williams, Annual Judicial Review, 31 J. Am. INST. OF PLANNFR 252 (1965). No prize
was awarded in Williams, Annual JudicialReview, 32 J. Am. INST. OF PLANFRS 163 (1966).
11 For example, many of the newer "flexibility" devices are struck because the courts
do not recognize them as zoning. McDonald v. Board of Commissioners, 238 Md. 549,
210 A.2d 325 (1965), is a typical case in which a court overturned a municipal decision
because the decision involved a "flexibility" device. The dissent is worth reading.
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prove virtually anything the municipality wants to do. This is caused
by overeagerness to appear modern and progressive, and inability to
distinguish between (1) what should be approved because it is merely
new and (2) what should be disapproved because it is bad zoning.
Since I am most familiar with the California Supreme Court, which
approves virtually anything the municipality wants to do, I want to
discuss some cases where that court has allowed a misuse of governmental power in zoning. In doing this, I want to add myself to the
small but growing list of commentators who feel that local governmental decision makers are getting away with far too much. An affluent society should expect more justice as well as more services from
its governments. The time has passed when the courts were well advised to take an obiesant, head in the sand, molly coddling attitude
toward local governmental zoning decisions. It is a time for honesty.
Zoning is now as tough as nails; it is not a tender plant to be carefully nurtured by the courts. The overturning of a few stupid or dishonest municipal decisions will not result in societal destruction. No
crisis in our time demands that local zoning bodies be able to do anything they please.
Asserting the desirability of a larger role for the courts vis-A-vis the
local decision makers is not fashionable. Better to sidestep the problem of court involvement with municipal stupidity and corruption
through a statewide review body, an ombudsman, or some other
device. Until recently it would have been considered equally stodgy
to suggest a judicial role in segregation, malapportionment, or tax
assessment.
The local sovereign is being stripped of its immunity; it should
also be stripped of some of its regulatory omnipotence. In any event,
overturning what the next lower body did is the name of the game
in zoning. The local legislative body (wearing its administrative appeal hat) routinely overrules the board of appeals, which in turn frequently overrules the building inspector or zoning administrator. The
local legislative body (wearing its legislative hat) routinely overrules
the planning commission. The makers of the final decision in the
municipality are probably surprised when the courts do not play the
same game.
Examples of the misuse of governmental power in zoning are legion.
They include:
1. Zoning for Improper Purpose. If large lot zoning is really being
used to segregate races rather than preserve light and air, for example,
the courts should be able to discover this fact. Courts which approve
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virtually everything the municipality does ought to scrutinize the purpose of the zoning more carefully and be more willing to hold illegitimate purposes ultra vires the enabling act.
Deerfield Park District v. Progress Development Corp.12 is an instructive case, although it is not a zoning case. The Deerfield Park
District had condemned a subdivision for a public park to prevent
the subdivider from selling lots to Negroes. Since the acquisition of
land for public parks is a proper municipal purpose, the court upheld
the condemnation. No doubt if the Park District had decided the next
day that it did not need the land, the court would have upheld the
transfer to a more cooperative subdivider. After all, it is a proper municipal purpose to sell unneeded public land.
Courts should realize that, if they deny redress of wrongs of the sort
seen in the Deerfield case, these wrongs will go forever unredressed.
It is dishonest for courts to deny relief and then to commiserate with
the wronged parties by saying that municipal actions that serve no
proper purpose will be struck: a proper purpose can almost always
be found or manufactured. It is also dishonest for courts to decline
to interfere in Deerfield-type situations on the ground that the voters
will "throw the rascals out." More likely, the voters would have voted
the governing body out of office if it had not misused its municipal
powers.
Sometimes, where the legislative process is clearly incapable of redressing gross wrongs, the courts ought to interfere. This is not to
carry a brief for wholesale second guessing by the courts of legislative
decisions. But sometimes the courts might be able to do the legislature
a favor. For example, in DeSena v. Gulde 3 the village board had faced
the alternative of staying with its decision to zone a Negro residential
area for light industry-a decision that had allegedly been correct in
terms of zoning considerations-or of confronting riots and boycotts.
The board had chosen to rezone back to residential. The court considered the circumstances surrounding the rezoning and held that
rezoning for the de facto purpose of avoiding riots and boycotts was
improper. The court's decision enabled the board to reconsider the
matter and to do so with greater freedom. This same purpose could
have been accomplished in the Deerfield case, where there was evidence that the Park District had not wanted to condemn the land,
but had wilted before the crass prejudice of its electorate.
12 22 III. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961), afj'd on rehearing,26 Ill. 2d 296, 186 N.E.2d
360 (1962).
13 24 App. Div. 2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1965).
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2. Legislative Process. If there is an aldermanic courtesy system
operating in a community (rezonings approved only if the alderman
in the area gives his nod), the courts should know about it and strike
the legislation. I know of no law authorizing the delegation of a legislative function to one legislator without any standards.
3. Bribery and Corruption. The courts should decide what is an
intolerable level of corruption. In some communities the level is way
too high. Hints of corruption should not lead the courts to look the
other way as hard as they can, or to give relief to injured parties for
spurious reasons. On any evidence, the matter should be remanded to
the local governmental body for a redetermination. The publicity
attendant on such remands will likely lower the level of corruption
to an acceptable point.
4. Municipalities Ignoring Their Own Precedents. The courts seldom hold that one local zoning decision is precedent for another. A rezoning, variance, or special use permit for X does not entitle Y to one,
even though X's and Y's circumstances are identical. Similarly, a denial
of X's request does not mean Y's request will be denied. Need equal
protection be so little observed in zoning? Courts should be more
critical of local decisions that are indistinguishable from, and close in
time to, other decisions. Some burden should be imposed on municipalities to give good reasons for their changes of position.
5. Municipal Disregard of Court Decisions. When a municipality
zones for fifty acre minimums, a court may strike it. The municipality
may then zone for 49 acre minimums, and the landowner must go to
court again. Where it finds a pattern of knowing and gross disregard
for judicially established standards, a court should order appropriate
zoning for the property. There is precedent for this kind of court
order. 14 A court should also do the zoning where municipality X
makes a landowner go to court to invalidate zoning that is like that
invalidated in municipality Y by a well known high court decision
in the same state.
6. Regulations that Constitute Takings. A municipality now risks
nothing by passing irresponsibly unconstitutional legislation. The
legislation is merely declared unconstitutional. When land regulation
legislation is declared unconstitutional as constituting a taking, affected landowners should be able to demand compensation for the
imposition of the regulation. The theory of inverse condemnation
(that when land is taken without an eminent domain proceeding, the
landowner can initiate proceedings) should apply. Courts would not
14 Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335, 382 P.2d 375 (1963).
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grant the remedy in most cases, but occasional application might make
municipalities a good deal more responsible. Courts have not applied
this theory,15 but commentators, 16 including a member of Mr. Babcock's firm, 17 have suggested its usefulness.
7. False Classification Cases. Annoying court opinions include those
dealing with classification. In Kelly v. MahoneyI8 the court upheld
an ordinance permitting turkey ranches but not chicken ranches, on
the ground some reason must have made the classification a sensible
one. In fact, there probably was no such reason. Similarly, in Snow v.
City of Garden Grove 9 a landowner tried to secure a permit for a
storage yard for moved houses. This use was not expressly permitted
in the zone; indeed, probably no community in the United States has
thought about including such a use in its ordinance. The zone was,
however, available for similar kinds of obnoxious uses, and similar
kinds of obnoxious uses already occupied the neighborhood. The court
spent pages justifying the classification, when the simple fact was that
the neighbors did not want the storage yard, and were in luck because
the community had not thought about putting such a use in its
ordinance. Where a classification arises by chance, courts ought to
strike it.
8. Spurious Motives Given for Decision. The courts do zoning no
good when they decide cases in the tradition of "we uphold the banning of billboards because of the immoral activities that go on behind
them." Fear of immorality is not the real reason. Similarly, in Bringle
v. Board of Supervisors20 the court upheld a required street dedication
as a condition on a variance on the ground that alleviating traffic congestion is a legitimate exercise of the police power. The real motive
was that the community wanted to widen the road, and imposing the
condition saved the purchase price of the right of way. The willingness of the court to focus on a spurious reason resulted in an unpalatable decision and a lost opportunity. Additional evidence as to the
real reason should have been taken on appeal or on retrial.
15 But cf. Smith v. County of Santa Barbara, - Cal. App. 2d -, 52 Cal. Rptr. 292
(1966); Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. State, 233 Cal. App. 2d 349, 43 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1965);
Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963). The theory
does apply where the governmental body decides that the regulation will remain and
that therefore compensation will be paid.
16 Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3, 47-48.
17 Bosselman, The Third Alternative in Zoning Litigation (pts. 1 & 2), 17 ZONING DIGS
73, 113 (1965).
18 185 Cal. App. 2d 799, 8 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1960).
19 188 Cal. App. 2d 496, 10 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1961).
20 54 Cal. 2d 86, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493, 351 P.2d 765 (1960).
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9. Test Cases. Finally, there are some "test" cases that bother my
sense of justice. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Gage,21 the
court approved the termination of a nonconforming business use in
a residential zone. Given this authority, one might suppose that there
was a wholesale termination of such uses in Los Angeles. In fact, there
were only a few other terminations. Defendant Gage was sacrificed to
establish a principle; this principle was applied to no one else. In
light of these subsequent developments (or lack thereof), Gage should
now be able to bring an action for damages. Apparently the only
reason for bringing the action against him was to establish a principle, which principle is now in the public domain, and the public
ought to pay for the benefit. Alternatively, the original court should
have required the city to state that, if successful, it intended to proceed against others similarly situated. A final alternative might have
been to delay the date of the judgment until it could be determined
whether the city planned to proceed against others.
Miscellaneous Observations on Mr. Babcock's Discussion

While an author probably should not be faulted for what he leaves
out, there are at least two significant things Mr. Babcock failed to
cover. First, he does not indicate why municipalities usually win zon-

ing cases in the courts of California and New Jersey, and often as not
lose these cases in such states as Ohio and Minnesota. He merely states
the fact. (Actually, California and New Jersey are not in the same class.
In California, the municipal batting average is probably around .950;
in New Jersey, the second ranking planner's 22 state, it is probably
around .750. The jump from California to New Jersey is almost as
great as that from New Jersey to Ohio and Minnesota, for in the
latter two states municipal averages are probably around .500.) Does
California's judicial climate differ from that of Minnesota because
of size, rates of growth and change, professionalism, amount of place
orientation in people, progressive or conservative judicial tradition,
early precedents, nature of enabling act, amount of home rule, reputation for local governmental competence or corruption, amount of
urbanization, or the fact that Minnesota once tried zoning by emi21 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
22 In Cunningham, Zoning Law in Michigan and New Jersey: A Comparative Study,
63 MICH. L. REv. 1171 (1965), the author describes New Jersey as having a "planner's"
court (i.e., one where municipalities often win), and Michigan as having a "lawyer's"
court (i.e., one where landowners often win). In his letter of August 12, 1965, responding
to mine, Mr. Cunningham agreed that as a planner's court, California's represents the
extreme.
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nent domain (and statutes relating to this are still on the bookss)?

I have long looked for a good study on this matter.
The second thing Mr. Babcock does not discuss is the role of corruption. Of course, he does not engage in it, but he does practice principally in Cook County, Illinois. Perhaps the existence of widespread
corruption at the local zoning body level is a myth. 24 Mr. Babcock must
know. No discussion of zoning is complete without indicating whether
corruption exists, and, if it does, what can be done about it.
Mr. Babcock points to a number of myths of zoning and persuasively
demolishes most of them. Unfortunately, he selects "zoning is negative" for demythologizing. He says, for example, that zoning compelled
the development of Westchester County, N.Y., into a sea of single
family homes on large lots. Of course, a negative regulation may have
a positive effect; the zoning of an area only for the growing of aquatic
plants2 5 will cause that if anything. Relative to other land use tools,
however, zoning is negative. It is negative as compared, for example,
to public housing or urban renewal. Even subdivision controls are
more positive than zoning, for their focus is more on shaping than
on limiting kinds of development.
Finally, Mr. Babcock makes a number of statements which are erroneous in my view and not necessary to support his thesis.2 6 For example, contract zoning is not a fairly recent "flexibility" device; it has
been around for a rather long time. 27 Also, it is my impression that
most courts are upholding requirements of park land dedications as
28
conditions for subdivision approval.
23 Minn. Stat. §§ 462.12-462.17 (1965) applies to first class cities Minneapolis, St. Paul,
and Duluth.
24 Dennis O'Harrow, executive director of the American Society of Planning Officials,
is concerned enough about corruption in zoning to propose a National Zoning Crime
Commission. Planning 1965, at 345.
25 Morris County Land Imp. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 193 A.2d
232 (N.J. 1963).
26 My experience has been that one's "feeling" for the law of zoning is considerably
shaped by the law of the state with which one is most familiar. In writing the earlier
chapters of a work on California zoning, I was forever fighting the California cases and
trying to force them into the "feeling" for zoning that I had acquired from writing on
Wisconsin zoning. On the basis of my current "feeling" for zoning, I think Mr. Babcock
has inaccurately stated some aspects of zoning law.
27 Until 1960 San Francisco's zoning ordinance authorized contract zoning. The device
turns up in California cases at least as far back as Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal. 2d 341, 115
P.2d 455 (1941).
28 Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs
on New Suburban Residents through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
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CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this review I praised Mr. Babcock's book. That
now seems somewhat inconsistent with my subsequent criticism. The
inconsistency is due in part to the fact that Mr. Babcock caused me
to think. In criticizing his book I am in part thrashing those courts
that presume too much in the way of municipal responsibility. Mr.
Babcock's suggestions are not the full answer, I am sure, and some are
wrong. Nevertheless, I know of no book that is as likely to cause lawyers and others to search their souls for some better answers in zoning.
DONALD

G.

HAGMAN*

Associate Professor of Law, The University of California at Los Angeles; Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Minnesota.

The Securities Markets, Operations and Issues. SIDNEY ROBBINS. The
Free Press, New York: Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, 1966.
Pp. xvi, 303. $7.95.
A book written for as heterogeneous an audience as lawyers, economists, and students, and written about as complex a subject as the
securities markets, is not likely to satisfy many readers. Professor Robbins' book is no exception. A book directed to persons of such diverse
interests should either break new ground or demonstrate the usefulness of an interdisciplinary approach. Professor Robbins appears to be
trying to do the latter, but without much success.
The author does attend to the legal history of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's regulation of the securities markets. He does
discuss some economics of the securities markets. And he does provide
some knowledge of the mechanics of trading. What is lacking is an
integration of these three elements into an analysis of the securities
markets. Failing to achieve this, the book promises to disappoint lawyers, who will desire a much more detailed and careful treatment of
cases and legislation than is presented; economists, who will find the
standards of economic analysis and evidence unsatisfying; and students,
who will not feel that they have gained an intimate knowledge of
the mechanics of trading.
The book will be useful to those who wish to acquaint themselves
with the way in which the SEC approaches the problem of regulation.
The author reveals that historically the SEC has looked to several criteria to guide its activities. Among these are the protection of in-

